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PANDEMIC FEDERALISM
CARY COGLIANESE†
In the late 1950s, a Yale political scientist, Charles Lindblom,
published an article extolling the virtues of incremental policy
development—or what he called the “science of muddling through.”1
Lindblom contrasted incrementalism with comprehensively rational
decision-making.2 The latter operates much as textbooks instruct decisionmakers to solve problems: figure out what is wrong, identify all the
possible solutions, and carefully assess each possible solution before
choosing the one expected to work best at solving the problem. As much
as that sounds sensible, even desirable, Lindblom, a former president of
the American Political Science Association, observed that the real world
does not operate that way. Rather, problems are only partially understood,
solution sets are bounded to whatever comes to mind or seems workable,
and decision-makers never fully analyze each option the way the textbooks
recommend. In reality, policy-making proceeds through trial and error. We
muddle through.
Over the decades since Lindblom wrote, political scientists have
accepted his model of how the policy world operates.3 It is a messy world
indeed. But Lindblom went further than just deploying incrementalism as
a model to describe how the policy world actually operates. He extolled
the virtues of muddling through and argued that this was the better way to
try to approach policy decision-making.4 Trial and error, he put forward,
allows for action to be taken more expeditiously, before everything can be
studied and analyzed fully.5 And if—or, really, when—things do not turn
out exactly like they were intended, changes and mid-course corrections
could be made. Muddling through might be muddy, but it was at least
movement forward.
†
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Ben Salinger, Elizabeth Shackney, Katherine Smigelski, Timothy von Dulm, and Jasmine
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1. Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling” Through, 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
79-88 (1959).
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Michael Howlett & Andrea Migone, Charles Lindblom is Alive and Well
and Living in Punctuated Equilibrium Land, 30 POL’Y & SOC’Y 53, 56 (2011).
4. Charles E. Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, 39 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 517–
526 (1979).
5. Id.
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Lindblom’s theory has a lot in common with the virtues that have long
been extolled for federalism and the vital role of states within the overall
structure of governance within the United States.6 Federalism, of course,
reflects the historical development of the U.S. governmental system. As
with muddling through, it does a good job of describing how governance
emerged and operates in the United States. But federalism has its
normative side too. From the founding of the Constitution to today, the
states have had many adherents who have viewed them as the best units of
government to exercise principal responsibility for public welfare.
Federalism’s adherents see that it carries with it an underlying genius.
As with incrementalism, it too allows for trial and error, experimentation
with multiple solutions, and learning. Because ideas that are tried in one
state can diffuse to others, states can serve as laboratories of democracy,
as Justice Louis Brandeis put it.7
Yet what are virtues for some purposes are not necessarily virtues for
all purposes. That is a point about incrementalism that Paul Schulman, a
political scientist at a small liberal arts college in California, recognized in
the mid-1970s.8 Writing in the earliest days of his academic career,
Schulman published an article in his profession’s flagship journal, the
American Political Science Review, that directly challenged the prevailing
endorsement of Lindblom’s incrementalism as a model form of policy
decision-making.9 Schulman argued for what he called “nonincremental
policymaking.”10
Certain problems, Schulman said, could not be solved through trial and
error, simply because these problems did not leave much room for error. His
Exhibit A: the space program.11 For obvious reasons, NASA simply could
not have managed to make it to the moon in 1969 by muddling through. To
stand any hope of achieving its mission, NASA needed to approach
decision-making as a comprehensively rational exercise.12
Schulman’s argument amounted to the intellectual equivalent of
David taking on Goliath. But Goliath still won out in the end. Lindblom
6. Some legal scholars have lauded decentralized governance as a strategy for learning
through trial and error. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of
Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998).
7. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, L., dissenting)
(describing as “one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a [state may] serve as
a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country”).
8. Paul R. Schulman, Nonincremental Policy Making: Notes Toward an Alternative
Paradigm, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1354 (1975).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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remains one of the most cited political scientists of the last century.13 By
contrast, Schulman’s paper has garnered less than two hundred citations
over the decades.14 On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of
Lindblom’s article, political scientists could (and did) ask themselves:
“Are we all incrementalists now?”15 The answer was, by and large, “yes.”
Today, one might well ask the same question about federalism, which
has its ardent proponents on both the right and the left ends of the political
spectrum in the United States. Those on the right often cling to the
nostalgia of state’s rights from the bygone era of the nation’s founding.16
Those on the left see Washington, D.C., as increasingly irrelevant for
progressive social policy, which many advocates say emanates today more
meaningfully and nimbly at the level of state and city government.17 Still,
the point that Schulman offered about incrementalism seems to be exactly
the right one to make about federalism: Distributed and varied, state policy
decision-making will be simply counterproductive in some circumstances.
Federalism is simply not well-suited to solving some problems. And
combating viral pandemics is surely one of these, as the COVID–19
pandemic has made evident.18
13. Rune Premfors, Review Article: Charles Lindblom and Aaron Wildavsky, 11 BRIT.
J. POL. SCI. 201 (1981) (describing Lindblom’s article on “muddling through” as “one of
the most widely read pieces written by a contemporary social scientist”); Yale News, In
Memoriam: Charles Edward Lindblom, Helped Found ISPS at Yale (Feb. 20, 2018),
https://news.yale.edu/2018/02/20/memoriam-charles-edward-lindblom-helped-foundisps-yale [https://perma.cc/VA9K-8E22] (describing “muddling through” article as “one
of the most frequently cited publications in political science literature”).
14. A search in Google Scholar yields a list of 193 sources citing to Schulman’s article.
15. Christine R. Allison & Denis Saint-Martin, Half a Century of “Muddling”: Are We
There Yet?, 30 POL’Y & SOC’Y 1, 4 (2017).
16. See, e.g., Yuval Levin, The Next Conservative Movement, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 15,
2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-next-conservative-movement-1460741085 [https
://perma.cc/EZ69-H9FU]; Ernest A. Young, The Conservative Case for Federalism, 74
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 874, 882 (2006). See generally J.M. Balkin, Federalism and the
Conservative Ideology, 19 URBAN L. 459 (Summer 1987).
17. See, e.g., BARRY G. RABE, STATEHOUSE AND GREENHOUSE: THE EMERGING
POLITICS OF AMERICAN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY (2004); Heather K. Gerken & Joshua
Revesz, Progressive Federalism: A User’s Guide, 44 DEM. J. (2017), https://democracy
journal.org/magazine/44/progressive-federalism-a-users-guide [https:// perma.cc/2KVJ4QP2]; Alexander A. Reinert, Joanna C. Schwartz & James E. Pfander, To Reform Policing
Accountability, States Need Not Wait on Supreme Court and Congress, USA TODAY (Feb.
5, 2022), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2022/02/05/police-reform-start-statescongress-supreme-court/9287751002/ [https://perma.cc/WS4V-NWUT]. See also Ilya
Somin, How Liberals Learned to Love Federalism, WASH. POST (July 12, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/how-liberals-learned-to-love-federalism/ 2019/07/
12/babd9f52-8c5f-11e9-b162-8f6f41ec3c04_story.html [https://perma.cc/B2KW-RFBP].
18. ANDY SLAVITT, PREVENTABLE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW LEADERSHIP FAILURES,
POLITICS, AND SELFISHNESS DOOMED THE U.S. CORONAVIRUS RESPONSE 45 (2021) (“There
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This lesson from the COVID–19 pandemic—namely, that federalism
complicates an effective national public health response to pandemics—
needs to be learned so the United States will not be fated to muddle so
tragically through the next pandemic as it has the one that broke out in
2020. What will ultimately be needed in future pandemics will be both
stronger federal authority and more responsible national leadership
exercising it. A pandemic, in other words, demands a matching pandemic
federalism, in contrast with the federalism that operates during normal
times, when muddling through can be tolerated better and time exists for
policy experimentation. Pandemic federalism amounts to a temporary but
responsive reconfiguration of authority and responsibility that aims for a
decidedly non-incremental and nationally coordinated response that can
meet society’s demands of the moment.19
I.
Pandemics are inherently cross-jurisdictional problems. As long as
people infected with a communicable virus travel from one jurisdiction to
another, viral outbreaks will cross political and legal borders and become,
in federal systems, problems for national governments. Acknowledging
this reality is not to say that closing borders will be the best solution to a
viral outbreak. Rather, it is simply to observe that, with cross-border
movement, if one jurisdiction fails to respond adequately to a viral
outbreak within its borders, a virus will inevitably spread to other
jurisdictions. This will be especially likely when individuals infected by
the virus show no signs or symptoms of infection, for then they will not
even realize that they might be transmitting the virus and will have no
reason to limit their interstate movement. This cross-border movement of
infected individuals is exactly what the United States has experienced
since the introduction of the SARS-CoV-2 virus—or coronavirus—in late
2019 or early 2020.20
is no ‘commonsense’ or ‘instinctual’ way to respond to a pandemic. There are right moves
that must be made in the right order, quickly . . . ”).
19. In this respect, “pandemic federalism” can be contrasted with more chaotic terms
used to describe modern federalism. See, e.g., Thomas A. Birkland, et al., Governing in a
Polarized Era: Federalism and the Response of U.S. State and Federal Governments to
the COVID–19 Pandemic, 51 PUBLIUS 650-672 (2021) (“kaleidoscopic federalism”);
Heather K. Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1695 (2017) (“uncooperative
federalism”); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077 (2014)
(“partisan federalism”); Cynthia J. Bowling & J. Mitchell Pickerill, Fragmented
Federalism: The State of American Federalism 2012-13, 43 ANN. REV. FEDERALISM 315
(2013) (“fragmented federalism”).
20. The novel coronavirus, SARS-SoV-2, causes the disease known as COVID–19,
although colloquially COVID–19 is sometimes referred to as both the virus and the disease.
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The United States did cancel international airline flights for a period
of time, and domestic air travel plummeted in the number of passengers in
late March and April of 2020. Still, even at their lowest levels in the early
months of the pandemic, the nation’s airlines transported nearly 3 million
passengers per month.21 By mid-March 2020, researchers at the Yale
School of Public Health could aptly declare that “[i]nterstate transmission
of the novel coronavirus that causes COVID–19 is now a much greater
public health threat in the United States than cases coming into the country
via international travel.”22
That threat never diminished in 2020. On the contrary, by May, the
number of domestic airline passengers increased to nearly 8 million
passengers, and it doubled to 16 million in June.23 By July, the number of
passengers on domestic flights was back up to nearly 25 million
passengers per month, a level at which it stayed for the rest of the year.24
Admittedly, some of these flights occurred between cities within the same
state, but most air travel flights cross state lines. Moreover, the movement
of passengers across state lines by air travel constitutes only one means for
the coronavirus to spread. Many people continued to move across borders
using other modes of transportation. Researchers documented, for
example, clear patterns of viral spread along areas served by major
interstate highways.25
Analysts have also used cell phone location data collected during the
pandemic to display patterns of interstate travel. A widely publicized heat
map released in March 2020 showed how people who were present at just
a single beach in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, diffused rapidly across large
swathes of the nation in the following weeks.26 A similar analysis of
location data from 26,000 cell phones present in Las Vegas over a single
21. Bureau of Transportation Statistics for Passengers on All Carriers at All Airports,
DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.transtats.bts.gov/Data_Elements.aspx?Data=1 [https://per
ma.cc/X37C-XH74].
22. Colin Poitras, Interstate Transmission of COVID–19 is Now Most Urgent Threat,
YALE SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH (Apr. 3, 2022), https://ysph.yale.edu/news-article/23678
[https://perma.cc/L8KP-ZTQR]. See also Joseph R. Fauver et al., Coast-to-Coast Spread
of SARS-CoV-2 during the Early Epidemic in the United States, 181 CELL 990-996 (2020),
https://www.cell.com/cell/pdf/S0092-8674(20)30484-0.pdf [https://perma.cc/VTS7-9B3R].
23. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 21.
24. Id.
25. For example, it was possible in 2020 to observe a spread of COVID “along I-80
between central Illinois and Iowa.” David Rubin, Gregory Tasian & Jing Huang, COVID–
19 Outlook: A Pivotal Moment in the U.S. Fight Against Coronavirus, CHILD. HOSP. OF
PHILA. POLICYLAB (July 1, 2020), https://policylab.chop.edu/blog/COVID–19-outlookpivotal-moment-us-fight-against-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/467U-MRVJ].
26. Tectonix (@TectonixGEO), TWITTER (Mar. 24, 2020, 9:44 PM), https://twitter.
com/TectonixGEO/status/1242628347034767361 [https://perma.cc/E7AF-4L9G].
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four-day period in July 2020 documented how “those same smartphones
also showed up in every state on the mainland except Maine in those same
four days.”27 Over 3,500 of the phones identified in Las Vegas in that fourday period in July could be found “in Southern California in the same four
days.”28 Roughly 2,700 of these cell phones made their way in a matter of
days to Arizona, and about another 1,000 to Texas—with “more than 800
in Milwaukee, Detroit, Chicago and Cleveland … and more than 100 in
the New York area.”29
Clearly, interstate travel has been a “huge driving factor” in the spread
of coronavirus.30 Even at the height of public fear and adherence to social
distancing in the spring of 2020, the coronavirus exploited the many
opportunities people afforded it to spread across state lines. Indeed,
various studies have documented the interstate transmission of
coronavirus following various super-spreader events in 2020, including a
business conference in Boston,31 college spring break trips to Florida,32
and a motorcycle rally in Sturgis, South Dakota.33
In a large nation with fifty states, where individuals possess a
constitutional right to travel across state lines,34 it should not be surprising
that the fate of the residents in any given state during a pandemic will
depend on how well other states manage to contain the virus. As one team
of public health researchers has asked rhetorically: “How well can North

27. Marshall Allen, Cellphone Data Shows how Las Vegas is “Gambling with Lives”
Across the Country, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 18, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/
article/cellphone-data-shows-how-las-vegas-is-gambling-with-lives-across-the-country
[https://perma.cc/T8A9-BE64].
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Rubin, Tasian & Huang, supra note 25.
31. Jacob E. Lemieux et al., Phylogenetic Analysis of SARS-CoV-2 in the Boston Area
Highlights the Role of Recurrent Importation and Superspreading Events (forthcoming),
MEDRXIV https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7457619/pdf/nihpp-2020.08.2
3.20178236.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZC7S-7KNW].
32. Daniel Mangrum & Paul Niekamp, JUE Insight: College Student Travel
Contributed to Local COVID–19 Spread, J. Urb. Econ. (forthcoming), https://papers.ss
rn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3606811 [https://perma.cc/F3KX-8EBK].
33. Melanie J. Firestone et al., COVID–19 Outbreak Associated with a 10-Day
Motorcycle Rally in a Neighboring State-Minnesota, August-September 2020, 69
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 1771 (2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/
volumes/69/wr/pdfs/mm6947e1-H.pdf [https://perma.cc/NFG2-JB77].
34. “The constitutional right to travel from one State to another, and necessarily to use
the highways and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce in doing so, occupies a
position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has been firmly
established and repeatedly recognized.” United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966).
See also Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283 (1849); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 44 (1867);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999).
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Carolina, for example, continue to mitigate transmission if South Carolina
and Florida remain slow-footed in their response?”35
Just asking this question acknowledges, of course, the key role that
states play in public health in the United States. Although the federal
government has assumed many responsibilities in other domains over the
years—and federal institutions such as the Centers for Disease Control do
play a role in responding to pandemics—it remains the case that state and
local institutions make up the nation’s principal public health
infrastructure. Indeed, as counterintuitive as it may seem, in the face of a
global public health crisis, the responses by state and local governments
are crucial.36 The needed on-the-ground resources such as hospitals and
medical teams are physically distributed across the country and operate in
a decentralized network of public and private institutions. In addition,
subnational governments also have resources needed to enforce school and
work closures as well as monitor compliance with other requirements,
such as mask-wearing and vaccinations.
The differences in capacity across levels of government are evident
just from comparing data on the key component of the nation’s public
health infrastructure: people. Although the federal Veterans Health
Administration employs about 370,000 health care workers,37 this is only
a tiny drop in the bucket of a health care sector in the United States that
employs about 20 million workers overall38—most of whom are working
in public or private hospitals or clinics that are licensed and regulated at
the state level. Similarly, the number of personnel at federal public health
agencies—about 10,000 employees at the Centers for Disease Control39
and 6,500 commissioned officers in the U.S. Public Health Service40—
35. Rubin, Tasian & Huang, supra note 25.
36. Cary Coglianese & Neysun A. Mahboubi, Administrative Law in a Time of Crisis:
Comparing National Responses to COVID–19, 73 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2021). Tribal
governments’ responses are also crucial. For a helpful discussion of tribal actions in the
wake of COVID-19, see Katherine Florey, The Tribal COVID-19 Response, REG. REV.
(Mar. 17, 2021), https://www.theregreview.org/2021/03/17/florey-tribal-covid-19-response/
[https://perma.cc/46G4-Q4VZ].
37. About VHA, VETERANS HEALTH ADMIN., https://www.va.gov/health/aboutvha.a
sp#:~:text=VA%2C%20the%20nation’s%20largest%20health,complexity%20(VHA%20
outpatient%20clinics [https://perma.cc/H2AM-ACA4] (last visited Apr. 7, 2022).
38. Lynda Laughlin, et al., 22 Million Employed in Health Care Fight Against COVID–
19, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2021/04/who-are-ourhealth-care-workers.html#:~:text=There%20were%2022%20million%20workers,
American%20Community%20Survey%20 [https://perma.cc/3JAG-XYCM].
39. Adam Andrzejewski, 10,000 CDC Employees Earn $1.1 Billion Annually, FORBES
(Feb. 29, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/adamandrzejewski/2020/02/29/10600-cdcemployees-earn-11-billion-annually/?sh=445582eb24da [https://perma.cc/F5KF-BH55].
40. U.S. Public Health Service Commissioned Corps, U.S. HEALTH & HUM. SERV. OFF.
SURGEON GEN., https://www.hhs.gov/surgeongeneral/corps/index.html [https://perma.cc/
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pales in comparison with estimates of the public health workforce at the
state and local levels.41 According to a McKinsey report, approximately
200,000 employees made up the total public health workforce nationwide
in 2020.42 The California Health and Human Services Agency has 30,000
employees,43 while the Texas Health and Human Services Commission
has about 36,000 employees.44 The New York City Department of Health
and Mental Hygiene alone has 6,000 employees.45
With the bulk of the public health infrastructure in the United States
existing at the state and local levels, the cross-border nature of viral spread
necessitates consistency and coordination in the substance and speed of
public health measures across these jurisdictional units and their
personnel.46 That is why North Carolina will indeed be unable to manage
a viral outbreak well if South Carolina or Florida—or any other state—
turns out to be slow or inept to act in response to a communicable disease.47
If a virus is to be contained, it needs swift, coordinated action to contain
it. A pandemic is not a time for muddling.
II.
Federalism faces inherent challenges in the face of pandemics. Any
decentralized system will struggle in circumstances that call for a quick,
coordinated response.
5QJ3-U378] (last visited Apr. 7, 2022).
41. How Does the Public Health Workforce Compare with the Broader Public Sector?,
CTR. FOR STATE & LOC. GOV’T EXCELLENCE (Mar. 2020), https://slge.org/wp-content/
uploads/2020/03/public-health-workforce.pdf#page=3 [https://perma.cc/HYR2-ZB7N].
42. Pooja Kumar, Emily Lurie & Ramya Parthasarathy, Building the US public-health
workforce of the future, MCKINSEY & CO. (Feb. 2, 2022), https://www.mckinsey.com/
industries/public-and-social-sector/our-insights/building-the-us-public-health-workforceof-the-future [https://perma.cc/K8EP-NBE8].
43. Remarks by Secretary Michael Wilkening at Office of National Coordinator 2018
Annual Meeting, CAL. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. AGENCY (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.chhs
.ca.gov/blog/2018/11/30/remarks-by-secretary-michael-wilkening-at-office-of-nationalcoordinator-2018-annual-meeting/ [https://perma.cc/J7CY-C5QY].
44. STAFF COMPENSATION REPORT, TEX. HEALTH & HUM. SERV. 2 (Jan. 2020),
https://www.hhs.texas.gov/sites/default/files/documents/laws-regulations/reports-presenta
tions/2020/staff-compensation-report-jan-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/YC8M-SWRY].
45. About the NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, NYC HEALTH, https://
www1.nyc.gov/site/doh/about/about-doh. (last visited Apr. 7, 2022) [https://perma.cc/FJB9-2S8F].
46. Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, Structured to Fail: Lessons from
the Trump Administration’s Faulty Pandemic Planning and Response, 10 MICH. J. ENV’T
& ADMIN. L. 329 (2021).
47. This is also why individuals in different states can suffer disproportionate harms,
as inequities exist across states in health care systems and other public health measures.
See generally JENNIFER PRAH RUGER, GLOBAL HEALTH JUSTICE AND GOVERNANCE 5 (2018)
(describing the health disparities that exist across different states in the United States).
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This is not to say that all aspects of decentralization must be resisted,
even during a pandemic. On the contrary, as noted, given the distributed
nature of communicable diseases, along with geographical and
demographic variation in disease patterns and the need to address
individual behaviors and health care needs on a local basis, many public
health responses must be delivered on the ground in some distributed
fashion.48 This will be true even in unitary systems of government.
In addition, the decentralization of a competitive marketplace can
provide fertile ground for welfare-enhancing innovation and resource
provision. Consider the decentralized process that led to the rapid
development of a COVID–19 vaccine and which was one of the relatively
few truly successful features of the U.S. response to the pandemic.49 Or
consider on the flip side, as a much less successful example, the debacle
that occurred early in the pandemic when the federal Centers for Disease
Control and U.S. Food and Drug Administration staked their hopes for too
long on centrally created testing kits that turned out to be defective.50
These two examples reveal the importance of effective national
response. It was, after all, the sluggishness of federal agencies—the CDC
and the FDA—that delayed the approval of the use of private testing that

48. Coglianese & Mahboubi, supra note 36, at 9 (“Containing [a viral] spread and
responding to the needs of infected individuals demands governance at the local level,
where actions can be taken to respond to individual behaviors and needs.”). Public health
policies need to take into account variation in people’s lives and this will necessitate
adapting policies and their implementation to local circumstances. With respect to
COVID–19, for example, government “leaders cost lives by issuing one-size-fits-all
guidance without being attuned to the facts on the ground for Black people.” HEATHER
MCGHEE, THE SUM OF US: WHAT RACISM COSTS EVERYONE AND HOW WE CAN PROSPER
TOGETHER 278 (2021). But cf. Olatunde C. Johnson & Kristen Underhill, Vaccination
Equity by Design, 131 YALE L. J. F. 53 (2021) (acknowledging the states’ role in public
health but recommending responses by federal agencies because they “have a comparative
advantage in collecting and rapidly analyzing data, publicizing information with
credibility, disseminating expertise through guidance, enforcing civil-rights violations, and
supporting information networks.”).
49. See, e.g., Operation Warp Speed: Accelerated COVID–19 Vaccine Development
Status and Efforts to Address Manufacturing Challenges, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF. (Feb. 11, 2021), https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-319 [https://perma.cc/HFT9H6M2]; Operation Warp Speed Contracts for COVID–19 Vaccines and Ancillary
Vaccination Materials, CONG. RES. SERV. (Mar. 1, 2021), https://crsreports.congress.gov
/product/pdf/IN/IN11560 [https://perma.cc/5ESD-KZXZ].
50. Alec Stapp, Timeline: The Regulations—and Regulators—That Delayed
Coronavirus Testing, DISPATCh (Mar. 20, 2020), https://thedispatch.com/p/timeline-theregulationsand-regulatorsthat?s=r [https://perma.cc/92MW-VADH]; Sheri Fink & Mike
Baker, ‘It’s Just Everywhere Already’: How Delays in Testing Set Back the U.S.
Coronavirus Response, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/
10/us/coronavirus-testing-delays.html [https://perma.cc/DT8J-TPFJ].
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was necessary to detect the virus.51 And even though private
pharmaceutical firms produced the rapid vaccine breakthroughs, their
swift action was spurred by actions of the federal government’s Operation
Warp Speed, which provided needed incentives and coordination.52
Despite the benefits that decentralized private market actions can
yield, they cannot be a complete substitute for governmental action. Given
the public goods nature of viral control, and the kind of collective action
such control demands, a decentralized market can never provide the
optimal response to a pandemic.53 Strong governmental action will always
be needed—and that entails confronting the challenges that pandemics
pose for federalist governments.
These challenges are borne out in the first instance by research on the
overall effectiveness of federal systems of government. This research
indicates that federal systems tend to perform less well than unitary or
centralized systems, all other things being equal.54
Summarizing empirical research comparing federalist countries and
unitary ones on a variety of measures of governmental performance,
Malcolm Feeley and Aniket Kesari have explained that the available
studies “almost all point in the same direction and to the same conclusion:
unitary systems out-perform federal systems on almost all indicators of
governmental effectiveness and efficiency, and quality of life.”55 Feeley
and Kesari’s own analysis finds that unitary systems appear to be better
equipped to manage the precise degree to which policies and their
implementation need to be centralized or decentralized, depending on the
nature of the problem at hand.56 In other words, unitary systems appear
more nimble and better able to coordinate.
It can thus hardly be surprising that the United States has faced
difficulties in managing its response to the COVID–19 pandemic. A
system comprising fifty-one major governing units (not to mention tens of
thousands of local ones) is simply not built well for a swift, coordinated
public health response.
The problems that federalism creates go beyond, though, just the
inherent and understandable difficulties of undertaking coordinated action
51. Id.
52. See generally CONG. RES. SERV., supra note 49.
53. For an account of limitations in the private health care marketplace during a
pandemic, see SLAVITT, supra note 18, at 173–194.
54. Malcolm M. Feeley & Aniket Kesari, Federalism as Compared to What? Sorting
Out the Effects of Federalism, Unitary Systems, and Decentralization, UC Berkeley Pub.
Res. Paper 97-124 (2017). See also Michael Livermore, The Perils of Experimentalism,
126 YALE L. J. 636 (2017).
55. Id.
56. Id.
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that can mean that viral contagion in one state can spread to others. In
modern society, where information flows freely and instantaneously
across borders, federalism can undermine effective risk communication
with the public. For decades, social scientists and public health experts
have emphasized the need for consistency in risk communication.57 But
federalism brings with it a great likelihood of inconsistencies, as different
governments and their officials send different messages. With COVID–
19, risk messaging became muddied when the federal government said
masks were needed, and yet some major state officials said otherwise.
People come to hear whatever message they want to hear, or they grow
unsure of whether to listen to anyone. Behavioral compliance with the best
public health practices inevitably suffers.58
In the United States, it is not merely that a federalist structure of
government makes inconsistencies in policies and risk communication more
likely, but the U.S. tradition of federalism almost seems to encourage it. That
tradition provides ready justifications for state officials to resist the national
government’s efforts to promote an effective, coherent public health
strategy. The experience with the COVID–19 pandemic revealed a fierce
possessiveness by state officials when it came to protecting their turf. At
least whenever state officials disfavored the federal government’s efforts at
coordination, they could, and did, revert to claiming their own sovereign
authority when taking actions that frustrated an effective national response.
57. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, IMPROVING RISK COMMUNICATION 121 (1989)
(emphasizing the importance of consistency to make risk communication credible); NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, ALERTING AMERICA: EFFECTIVE RISK COMMUNICATION: SUMMARY OF A
FORUM 4 (2003) (noting that “[r]isk communication messages need to be consistent”); Deborah
C. Glik, Risk Communication for Public Health Emergencies, 28 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 3840 (2007) (discussing the importance of consistency in risk communication).
58. Consistency in risk communication may be easier to achieve with unitary systems,
but it is by no means guaranteed. Across different parts of the U.S. government, and at
different points in time, messaging about COVID–19 varied in ways that compromised risk
communication. For example, federal public health officials frequently saw their public
messaging muddied, if not at times contradicted, by President Trump. See. e.g., Yanbai
Andrea Wang & Justin Weinstein, Pandemic Governance, 63 BOS. COLL. L. REV. (2022)
(“The federal government—and President Trump in particular—undermined actors at
every level of government, including at the federal level, causing confusion and
inconsistency”). Moreover, even federal public health officials themselves struggled at
times to maintain consistent messaging. In the earliest weeks, for example, they
discouraged mask-wearing as they were concerned about ensuring that medical
professionals would have enough protective gear and were unaware of the full extent of
transmission occurring via infected but asymptomatic individuals. After shifting to
recommending mask-wearing, the CDC then stated in the spring of 2021 that vaccinated
individuals no longer needed to wear masks, only a few months later to recommend yet
again that they wear them. Deborah Netburn, A Timeline on the CDC’s Advice on Face
Masks, L.A. TIMES (July 27, 2021), https://www.latimes.com/science/story/2021-0727/timeline-cdc-mask-guidance-during-covid-19-pandemic.
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Consider, for example, the reaction of numerous states to federal
measures to require vaccinations. By executive order, President Biden
required all federal workers and contractors to be vaccinated.59 The U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services required vaccinations of all
workers at health care facilities receiving Medicare funding.60 The federal
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) required all
employers with more than 100 employees either to test their workers
weekly or ensure that each employee was vaccinated.61 In addition, the
federal government mandated vaccinations for teachers in Head Start
programs62 along with those in schools operated by the Department of
Defense and the Bureau of Indian Education.63 The federal government
also issued orders or guidance at various times for the collection of
vaccination information, the wearing of masks, and self-isolation for
individuals who tested positive for COVID–19.64
Despite these federal measures reinforcing the message of
vaccinations and masking, not all state governments followed the federal
government’s lead. Some states, particularly in the South and West, even
actively resisted the federal efforts. At least eight states enacted laws to
prevent schools from requiring students to wear masks.65 Florida’s
governor signed both an executive order66 and legislation prohibiting
vaccine mandates to be imposed on anyone by any public or private
entity.67 The Texas governor adopted an executive order prohibiting any
governmental institution in the state from mandating that anyone receive
a COVID–19 vaccine.68

59. Exec. Order No. 14,043, 86 Fed. Reg. 50,989 (Sep. 9, 2021).
60. Biden-Harris Administration to Expand Vaccination Requirements for Health Care
Settings, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV. (Sep. 9, 2021), https://www.cms.gov/
newsroom/press-releases/biden-harris-administration-expand-vaccination-requirementshealth-care-settings.
61. COVID–19 Vaccination and Testing; Emergency Temporary Standard, 86 Fed.
Reg. 61,402 (Nov. 5, 2021).
62. Vaccine and Mask Requirements to Mitigate the Spread of COVID–19 in Head
Start Programs, 86 Fed. Reg. 68,052 (Nov. 30, 2021) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 1302).
63. Order No. 3402 COVID–19 Vaccine Mandate for Educators at Bureau of Indian
Education-Operated Schools, SEC. INTERIOR (Sep. 2, 2021), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi
.gov/files/elips/documents/so-3402-COVID–19-vaccine-mandate-for-educators-vaccineat-bureau-of-indian-education-operated-schools.pdf.
64. Id.
65. Christine Vestal, 10 States Have School Mask Mandates While 8 Forbid Them, PEW
(Aug. 12, 2021), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2021
/08/10/10-states-have-school-mask-mandates-while-8-forbid-them.
66. Fla. Exec. Order No. 21-81 (Apr. 2, 2021).
67. 29 Fla. St. Title § 381.00317.
68. Tex. Exec. Order No. GA-38, 46 Tex. Reg. 4,913 (Aug. 13, 2021).
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When officials in these and other states adopted policies in direct
contradiction with the approach taken at the national level, they did so by
embracing the rhetoric of state sovereignty. Florida’s Governor Ron
DeSantis, for example, declared that “[t]he states are the primary vehicles
to protect people’s freedoms, their health, their safety, their welfare, in our
constitutional system.”69 In enacting a law prohibiting state officials from
enforcing federal COVID–19 vaccine mandates, the Wyoming legislature
declared that “[t]he states are laboratories of good policy.”70
In upholding the states’ prerogative over public health, the federalist
tradition in the United States gives state officials a readily available excuse
to depart from, and even to resist, coordinated action by the federal
government. These officials might have had self-interested reasons for
resisting—such as playing to a different political base than national
leaders—but they can nevertheless cover up those political reasons and
couch their resistance in the language of federalism and appeals to
constitutional law. And that they did. Twenty-seven states notably joined
in taking to the Supreme Court a successful legal challenge to OSHA’s
vaccine-and-test mandate.71
State officials’ rhetorical appeals to federalism have a definite
grounding in constitutional doctrine. As early as the opening decades of
the nineteenth century, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that “the powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the states, are reserved to the states respectively.”72 The Court declared
in 1824 that “health laws … are not within the power granted to
Congress.”73 In 1849, the Court specifically upheld states’ authority to
“pass quarantine and health laws.”74 In the 1905 case of Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, the Court upheld states’ authority to require vaccinations,
pronouncing that “[t]he safety and the health of the people of
Massachusetts are, in the first instance, for that commonwealth to guard
and protect.”75
Constitutional recognition of states as the primary authorities on
matters of public health and welfare remains intact today, even as the
federal government has assumed greater authority to regulate private
conduct under the Interstate Commerce Clause. As recently as 2012, the
69. Jim Turner, Florida Governor Signs Raft of Anti-Vaccine Mandate Bills, ORLANDO
WEEKLY (Nov. 18, 2021), https://www.orlandoweekly.com/news/florida-gov-ron-desantis
-signs-raft-of-anti-vaccine-mandate-bills-30331848.
70. H.R. 1002, 66th Leg., Spec. Sess. 1 (Wyo. 2021).
71. Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. U.S. Dep’t Lab.,142 S. Ct. 661 (2022).
72. U.S. Const. amend. X.
73. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
74. Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283 (1849).
75. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
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Supreme Court has noted that “[t]he States … can and do perform many
of the vital functions of modern government.”76 The Court has praised the
nation’s federal structure of government by noting that it ensures that “the
facets of governing that touch on citizens’ daily lives are normally
administered by smaller governments closer to the governed.”77
The controversies that emerged during COVID–19 pandemic have
revealed not only the fierce vitality of this constitutional rhetoric of
federalism; they have also shown how this rhetoric allows government
officials to disclaim responsibility for addressing a problem when it has
clear cross-border effects.78 President Donald Trump tried to shift
responsibility to the states for responding to the pandemic.79 Confronted
with the risk of shortages of personal protective equipment and other
medical supplies, he said that procuring these supplies was up to the states:
“The federal government is not supposed to be out there buying vast
amounts of items and then shipping . . . we’re not a shipping clerk.”80 In
April 2020, Trump described the national government as “merely a backup for state government.”81 As Andy Slavitt has described, this abdication
of federal responsibility “was more of a political strategy than a public
health strategy”:
Trump would announce that the country would be reopening at
the end of the month, but states would have to solve the hard
problems. This way, if things opened and went badly, Trump
76. Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 535 (2012).
77. Id. at 536.
78. Jacob M. Grumbach & Jamila Michener, American Federalism, Political
Inequality, and Democratic Erosion, 699 ANNALS AMER. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.143, 153
(2022) (“When everybody is responsible, nobody is responsible.”).
79. See, e.g., Lindsay F. Wiley, Federalism in Pandemic Prevention and Response, in
PUBLIC HEALTH LAW WATCH, COVID–19 POLICY PLAYBOOK: LEGAL RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR A SAFER, MORE EQUITABLE FUTURE (2021) (“In 2020, the president, Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary, and other officials frequently blamed, rather
than partnered with states.”); SLAVITT, supra note 18, at 122-124 (discussing a strategy that
he refers to as the “state authority handoff”). As Slavitt writes, “Deborah Birx offered a
plan for success without federal involvement” that appealed to President Trump, but
apparently “Birx didn’t consider that states might choose to treat the guidelines as
optional—and certainly not that they would ignore them almost entirely.” Id. at 122.
80. Quint Forgey, ‘We’re Not a Shipping Clerk’: Trump Tells Governors to Step Up
Efforts to Get Medical Supplies, POLITICO (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news
/2020/03/19/trump-governors-coronavirus-medical-supplies-137658
[https://perma.cc/ZP5Z-AN5X].
81. Letter to Senate Minority Leader Charles E. Schumer on the Federal Coronavirus
Response (Apr. 2, 2020) (on file with The American Presidency Project at UC Santa
Barbara); see also 11th Hour, Trump Calls States ‘Complainers,’ Says Federal Govt. is Just a
‘Backup,’ MSNBC (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.msnbc.com/11th-hour/watch/trump-calls-statescomplainers-says-federal-govt-is-just-a-backup-81574469576 [https://perma.cc/SZ9F-RFJU].
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could point to the governors. If there weren’t enough diagnostic
tests, the states could be blamed. … Many states wouldn’t have
enough tests for months. The combination of opening by the end
of the month, a lack of tests, and the White House’s efforts to
avoid blame seemed like a surefire way for cases to grow. … [T]he
states would be helpless without the support of the federal
government.82
Around the same time, President Trump’s advisor and son-in-law, Jared
Kushner, declared that “[t]he states have to own the testing.”83 He said
“[t]he federal government should not own the testing…it’s got to be up to
the governors.”84 Kushner notoriously distinguished between “our
stockpile” of medical supplies—referring to what the federal government
had in store—and claimed that “the federal stockpile was … not supposed
to be states’ stockpiles that they then use.”85
Even President Joseph Biden—who successfully campaigned for
office on a promise to bring the coronavirus under control—once
acknowledged in a White House meeting with governors that “[t]here is
no federal solution” and that “[t]his gets solved at a state level.”86 In a
certain respect, that claim is factually accurate, given the distribution of
public health capacities at the state and local levels and the need for onthe-ground implementation of response efforts. But focusing only on the
importance of states also discounts the extreme cross-border nature of viral
outbreaks and the fundamental need for strong national leadership and
coordinated response.87 Perhaps that is why Biden immediately followed
82. SLAVITT, supra note 18, at 113-114.
83. William A. Haseltine, Kushner Comments Suggest Are Politically Motivated,
FORBES (Nov. 2, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/williamhaseltine/2020/11/02/kush
ner-comments-confirm-19-decisions-are-political-motivated/?sh=9e437601ff67
[https://perma.cc/U22E-7YG5].
84. Id.
85. Nicholas Wu, Jared Kushner Makes Coronavirus Briefing Appearance, Draws
Backlash for ‘Our Stockpile’ Comment, USA TODAY (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.usatoday
.com/story/news/politics/2020/04/03/coronavirus-jared-kushner-draws-backlash-our-stockpile
-comment/2938648001/ [https://perma.cc/2KUS-AN2C]; Franco Ordonez, Jared Kushner’s
Role In Coronavirus Response Draws Scrutiny, Criticism, NPR (Apr. 4, 2020), https://
www.npr.org/2020/04/04/826922646/jared-kushners-role-in-coronavirus-response-drawsscrutiny-criticism [https://perma.cc/R33B-7EPT].
86. Remarks by President Biden at COVID–19 Response Team’s Regular Call With the
National Governor’s Association, WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 27, 2021), https://www.whitehouse
.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/12/27/remarks-by-president-biden-at-Covid-19response-teams-regular-call-with-the-national-governors-association/ [https://perma.cc/8JH4N68Z].
87. Crisis situations, such as viral outbreaks, call for a coordinated response and a type
of “meta-leadership” that brings people together in joint action. JUDITH RODIN, THE
RESILIENCE DIVIDEND: BEING STRONG IN A WORLD WHERE THINGS GO WRONG (2014).
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up his statement to the governors with a request to them that “if you need
something, say something,” offering them the assurance that “we’re going
to have your back in any way we can.”88
III.
In a time of a pandemic, how exactly does the national government
better “have the backs” of the states and—more importantly—the entire
nation’s public? Fiscal authority has clearly been crucial in the federal
response to COVID–19. Massive recovery packages have funded
vaccines, paid for health care costs, and provided much-needed support
for the economy.89 Although much can be accomplished with spending, it
probably can never fully resolve the difficulties that emerge over
conflicting requirements for mask-wearing, vaccinations, and other public
health measures. The federal government was unable to provide needed
coordination over regulatory responses in the face of a hodge-podge of
state and local requirements (and non-requirements) generating confusion
and permitting contagion to spread.
In this respect, the United States proved to be far from the “perfect
union” that the Constitution was intended to help propel the nation
toward.90 The experience with the COVID–19 pandemic might even be
said to be reminiscent of the kinds of problems from lack of coordination
that the United States experienced in its budding years under the Articles
of Confederation. Just as the Constitution’s framers recognized the need
for stronger central governing authority more generally,91 the cross-border
spread of a viral outbreak reveals a comparable need for a pandemic
federalism comprising the strong, coordinated national measures
appropriate to a time of a national public health emergency.92
88. Remarks by President Biden, supra note 86.
89. See, e.g., Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), 15
U.S.C. §§ 9001-9034, 26 U.S.C. §§ 6428, 21 U.S.C. § 356j, 360b-1, 355h, 360fff-8, 379j71-379j-73, 15 U.S.C. § 9041-9080, 42 U.S.C. 801, 33 U.S.C. § 2238b-1, 2 U.S.C. § 5548,
17 U.S.C. § 710, 22 U.S.C. § 284cc, 282p, 290i-12, 290g-25 (2020); American Rescue
Plan Act of 2021, 15 U.S.C. §§ 9034, 9058b-9058d, 9009c, 9013, 9121, 9131, 9132, 9141;
26 USCA §§ 139I, 3131-3134, 6428B, 6432, 6720C, 7527A, 7530; 29 USCA § 1432; 42
U.S.C. §§ 711a, 802-805, 1320b–26, 1396w–6, 1397i, 3020g (2021). See generally John
Kincaid & J. Wesley Leckrone, COVID–19 and American Federalism, in FEDERALISM AND
THE RESPONSE TO COVID–19: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, (Rupak Chattopadhyay, Felix
Knüpling, Diana Chebenova, Liam Whittington & Phillip Gonzalez eds., 2021).
90. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
91. THE FEDERALIST NO. 16 (Alexander Hamilton).
92. These measures, of course, ought to be deployed nonarbitrarily and with full respect
to individuals’ due process rights. See, e.g., James G. Hodge, Jr., Lawrence O. Gostin,
Wendy E. Parmet, Jennifer B. Nuzzo, & Alexandra Phelan, Federal Powers to Control
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The substantial cross-state economic consequences associated with
the pandemic—not to mention the cross-border spread of the virus itself—
clearly provide the federal government with sufficient constitutional
authority to step in and impose common standards for individual behavior.
Nevertheless, the longstanding primacy of state authority over public
health necessarily limited and complicated the federal government’s
ability to respond with coordinated regulatory measures as needed in the
face of COVID–19.93
Current statutory law does give federal officials authority to act in the
face of public health emergencies.94 Under Section 361 of the Public
Health Service Act, for example, the Secretary of the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services can approve regulations that “in his judgment
are necessary to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of
communicable diseases from foreign countries into the States … or from
one State … into any other State.”95 Lower federal courts have upheld the
exercise of federal authority under this provision—such as to require a
mandatory 14-day isolation for an individual who was traveling from
overseas without proof of smallpox vaccination96 and to ban the sale of
certain kinds of animals out of concern for the spread of disease.97 But by
and large, the federal government’s use of Section 361 has been rather
limited throughout the nation’s history. Moreover, although federal
agencies have relied on Section 361 and other statutory authority in
important ways in the wake of COVID–19, some of the most significant
federal regulatory measures adopted under Section 361 have generated
litigation, producing results that have tended to weaken rather than
strengthen federal agencies’ ability to respond to future pandemics.
The Centers for Disease Control, for example, relied on Section 361
with the approval of the U.S. Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services to issue a national moratorium on housing evictions
Communicable Conditions: Calls for Reforms to Assure National Preparedness and
Promote Global Security, 15 HEALTH SEC. 123 (2017).
93. Donald F. Kettl, States Divided: The Implications of American Federalism for
COVID–19, 80 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 595–602 (2020); Nicole Huberfield, Sarah H. Gordon &
David K. Jones, Federalism Complicates the Response to the COVID–19 Health and
Economic Crisis: What Can Be Done?, 45 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y L. 951–965 (2020).
94. Legal Authority of the Secretary, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (last visited
Apr. 11, 2022), https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/support/secauthority/Pages/default.as
px#:~:text=The%20HHS%20Secretary%20has%20legal,and%20the%20Social%20Secur
ity%20Act [https://perma.cc/9EK9-2LBE].
95. Public Health Service Act § 361, 42 U.S.C.S. § 264(a).
96. U.S. ex rel. Siegel v. Shinnick, 219 F.Supp. 791 (E.D.N.Y. 1963) (holding that the
Public Health Service could mandate 14-day isolation to prevent the spread of smallpox).
97. Indep. Ass’n Turtle Farmers of La., Inc. v. U.S., 703 F.Supp 620 (W.D. La. 2010)
(holding the FDA had the power to uphold a thirty-five-year ban on the sale of baby turtles).
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during the COVID–19 pandemic. In the wake of the economic dislocation
the pandemic wrought, the moratorium was needed to reduce the viral
spread associated with people pursuing transient housing options. But the
Supreme Court held that the federal agency exceeded its statutory
authority. The Court concluded that the agency could not rely on a
“decades-old statute that authorizes [the federal government] to implement
measures like fumigation and pest extermination”—not to set housing
policy.98 Congress would have to pass new legislation if the CDC were to
be able to impose anything like its eviction moratorium: “Our precedents
require Congress to enact exceedingly clear language if it wishes to
significantly alter the balance between federal and state power and the
power of the Government over private property.”99
The Court reached much the same result with respect to a vaccine-ortest mandate that OSHA had adopted under its powers delegated via the
Occupational Safety and Health Act. The per curiam opinion of the sixmember majority on the Court described OSHA’s action as “no everyday
exercise of federal power.”100 Because OSHA’s statute authorizes it to
regulate occupational hazards, and COVID–19 pervades all facets of life
(not merely the workplace), the Court reasoned that this meant a
vaccination requirement exceeded OSHA’s authority.101 The Court
emphasized that, because the OSHA rule does not distinguish between
occupational risk and risk more generally, it took on the character of a
general public health measure, which the Court said OSHA was not
sufficiently clearly authorized to take under its statute.102 For the Court’s
majority, the vaccine-or-test mandate raised a “major question” requiring
greater specificity and clarity by Congress before the Court could find
OSHA had been given authority to issue its rule.103
The justices in the OSHA case were fully cognizant that more than
half the states had challenged OSHA’s rule104—and the opinion of the
Court even made a point to note that OSHA’s rule preempted contrary
state laws.105 Furthermore, three Justices—Gorsuch, Alito, and Thomas—
signed a concurring opinion that explicitly noted that “state and local
authorities possess considerable power to regulate public health,” and that
98. Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485,
2486 (2021).
99. Id. at 2489 (quoting United States Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n,
140 S. Ct. 1837 (2020)).
100. Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. U.S. Dep’t Lab.,142 S. Ct. 661, 665 (2022).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 666.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 665, 667 (Gorsuch, N., concurring).
105. Id. at 662.
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the states “enjoy the ‘general power of governing’ … [while] [t]he federal
government’s powers … are not general but limited and divided.”106
Several months after the Supreme Court’s decisions in the OSHA
vaccine and CDC eviction moratorium cases, a federal district court struck
down a separate CDC mandate for mask-wearing by passengers on public
transportation.107 The judge followed the main logic in the Supreme
Court’s earlier cases, declaring that the CDC lacked statutory authority to
effectuate a requirement with major economic and social implications. In
her ruling, the judge reasoned that the CDC’s interpretation of Section 361
would have effectuated a shift in public health authority vis-à-vis the
states:
[I]n this statute, the CDC finds a power over public health that was
“traditionally understood—and still is understood—as a function
of state police power.” That is so because it is an “ordinary rule of
statutory construction that if Congress intends to alter the usual
constitutional balance between the States and the Federal
Government, it must make its intention to do so unmistakably
clear in the language of the statute.”108
With these principles in mind, the judge concluded that Section 361 “has
no ‘unmistakably clear’ language indicating that Congress intended for the
CDC to invade the traditionally State-operated arena of population-wide,
preventative public-health regulations.”109 Although the federal
government filed an appeal, the decision of this single federal judge in
Tampa, Florida resulted in the lifting of masking requirements across the
nation for passengers using commercial airlines, trains, and buses as well
as associated airports and terminals.
Other lower court decisions have similarly impeded the federal
government’s ability to impose needed public health measures. Invoking
federalism and other arguments, a district court judge issued a preliminary
injunction barring the CDC from enforcing public health requirements it
imposed on cruise ships.110 The same district court judge, and others,
enjoined enforcement of the federal vaccine requirement for federal
contractors.111 Another district court judge invoked the Tenth Amendment,
106. Id. at 667 (Gorsuch, N., concurring).
107. Health Freedom Defense Fund, Inc. v. Biden, No. 8:21-cv-1693-KKM-AEP (Apr.
18, 2022).
108. Id. at 29-30 (citations omitted).
109. Id. at 30.
110. Florida v. Becerra, 544 F. Supp. 3d 1241 (2021) (noting inter alia that “the public
health power, including the power to quarantine, was traditionally understood—and still is
understood—as a function of state police power”).
111. See, e.g., Fla. v. Nelson, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 246185 (Dec. 22, 2021) (“By
requiring the vaccination of employees of contractors and subcontractors, Executive Order
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among other arguments, to justify enjoining enforcement of the federal
vaccine mandate for Head Start teachers.112
Overall, judicial decisions rejecting federal exertions of authority in
response to COVID–19 reveal not merely federalism’s rhetorical and
political power but also its consequential vitality as a matter of law. That
legal vitality will only continue to hamper effective responses to public
health threats in the future unless Congress enacts legislation clearly
authorizing federal action. Federal officials who possess a reluctance to
act will continue to have an excuse for failing to take responsibility. States
will continue to enjoy the license to go their own way and even actively
resist coordinated federal measures. Whenever the federal government
does step in and seeks to effectuate nationwide policies related to public
health, the Supreme Court can now be expected to approach the exercise
of federal authority with considerable skepticism.
This does not mean that the federal government must remain bereft of
national regulatory authority in a future viral outbreak. On the contrary,
the logic underlying the Supreme Court’s decisions in the OSHA and CDC
cases actually endorses Congress’s ability to empower federal agencies to
adopt public health mandates to respond to pandemics.113 In invoking the
major questions doctrine, the Court merely said that Congress needed to
be clearer, which implies that had Congress implemented more precise
legislation, then OSHA and the CDC could have imposed their
requirements.114 In fact, in a separate case decided on the same day as its
OSHA ruling, the Supreme Court in a 5-4 per curiam opinion upheld the
authority of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to
require vaccinations of health care workers.115 It found that vaccines fit
better with CMS’s traditionally exercised rulemaking authority, even
14042 intrudes into a matter traditionally committed to the state.”). See generally Richard
Arnholt, Injunctions May Only Pause Gov’t Contractor Vaccine Mandate, LAW360 (Dec.
22, 2021).
112. Louisiana v. Becerra, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1333 (Jan. 1, 2022) (“The States have
broad authority to enact legislation for the public good (“police power”), but the federal
government has no such authority … The Supreme Court is unlikely to assume Congress
has meant to effect a significant change into the sensitive state and federal relations. …
Absent a clear statement of intention from Congress, there is a presumption against
statutory construction that would significantly affect the federal-state balance.”).
113. In his concurrence in the OSHA case, Justice Gorsuch even pointed to legislation
where Congress—in the context of immigration requirements—has specifically required
vaccinations. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. U.S. Dept’t of Labor, 142 S. Ct. 661, 668 (2022)
(Gorsuch, J. concurring) (referring expressly to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(i)).
114. Again, Justice Gorsuch, in concurring in the OSHA case, expressly acknowledged
that Congress has the power to respond to the pandemic—but then he suggested, perhaps
somewhat ominously, that his acknowledgement only applies “under the law as it stands
today.” Id. at 670.
115. Biden v. Missouri, 142 S.Ct. 647 (2022).
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though the legislation authorizing CMS’s action never spoke specifically
of vaccines but only authorized in the most general terms requirements
that were deemed “necessary in the interest of health and safety.”116
Despite a majority’s acceptance of CMS’s authority under this highly
general statutory delegation, it would be unwise to assume that federal
agencies will be able to act flexibly in the future on the basis of such
general authority. Not only did the Supreme Court reject a similar
assertion under the flexible terms of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act, but it is also clear that the Court is increasingly inclined to demand
statutory specificity under the so-called major questions doctrine, if not
eventually also under a reinvigorated nondelegation doctrine.
To prepare the nation for the next serious outbreak—and there will be
another one, whether of a mutation of the SARS-CoV-2 virus or eventually
another virus altogether117—Congress can act prospectively to adopt
legislation that specifically overturns the court decisions that have rejected
the federal government’s assertion of public health regulatory authority.
Congress can act to make clear that federal agencies possess the needed
authority—exercised on a temporary basis during public health
emergencies—to impose the kinds of behavioral mandates that courts have
struck down, such as those related to workplace vaccination and testing,
mask-wearing in public transportation, and bans on housing evictions.118
Congress, in other words, can restructure public health authority to create
116. Although cited by the Court as a basis of authority, the quoted terms actually come
from the definition of a covered hospital in the Medicare statute, which includes among its
defining criteria an institution’s compliance with relevant health and safety requirements.
2 U. S. C. §1395x(e)(9). The actual delegation of rulemaking authority dates to the 1935
Social Security Act, the relevant provision of which the Court also cited but which is even
more general in that it does not even refer to health and safety. 42 U.S.C. §1302(a) (“[T]he
Secretary of Health and Human Services . . . shall make and publish such rules and
regulations, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary to the efficient
administration of the functions with which each is charged under this chapter.”). In arguing
that Congress did not speak clearly enough to give CMS authority to mandate health
workers be vaccinated, the four dissenters in this case made a point to note that “[v]accine
mandates . . . fall squarely within a State’s police power.” 142 S.Ct. 655, 658 (Thomas, J.
dissenting).
117. After all, as Juliette Kayyem insightfully reminds us, the devil never sleeps.
JULIETTE KAYYEM, THE DEVIL NEVER SLEEPS: LEARNING TO LIVE IN THE AGE OF DISASTERS
(2022).
118. For related suggestions, see Rebecca L. Haffajee & Michelle M. Mello, Thinking
Globally, Acting Locally—The U.S. Response to Covid–19, 22 N. ENGL. J. MED 382 (2020)
(urging Congress to “leverage its interstate-commerce powers to regulate economic
activities that affect the interstate spread of SARS-CoV-2”); SLAVITT, supra note 18, at
256 (recommending that Congress provide authority for “[m]andatory public health
measures” in compliance with CDC recommendations while also “requiring continual
reauthorization by Congress”).
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a pandemic federalism when normal federalism stands in the way of
needed action.119
Congress can also consider going further by enacting legislation to
ensure that other reasonable federal regulatory interventions would be
authorized during a future pandemic—actions that the federal government
might have taken in response to COVID–19 but did not do so, perhaps out
of uncertainty over its authority. This could include, for example,
measures to ensure that federal agencies could implement a robust,
national vaccination registration system. This might also include
legislation specifically authorizing the imposition of vaccination mandates
for domestic air passengers.120 Given that nursing homes have experienced
a significant loss of life, future legislative action could further provide
authority for increased federal intervention and oversight of nursing
homes and assisted living centers as needed during times of a public health
emergency.121 New federal legislation should also tackle the racial
inequities that the coronavirus has laid bare and require that future
nationwide vaccination and other public health campaigns actively avoid
perpetuating such inequities.122
One of the most foundational steps for Congress to take would be to
adopt legislation authorizing the federal government to establish
regulations imposing consistent and mandatory standards for viral testing
and reporting of test results.123 From the pandemic’s earliest days, the
United States has suffered from a shortage of testing data, which has
greatly impeded public health officials’ ability to trace and contain viral
119. For a thoughtful and especially promising proposal for “role clarity” legislation,
see Wang & Weinstein, supra note 58. Part of any legislative restructuring should include
consideration of mechanisms for accountability and oversight. See Nancy J. Knauer, The
COVID–19 Pandemic and Federalism: Who Decides?, 23 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y
1 (2020–2021).
120. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Vaccine Mandates and Roads Not Taken, REGUL. REV. (Jan.
24, 2022), https://www.theregreview.org/2022/01/24/pierce-vaccine-mandates-roads-nottaken/.
121. For a similar suggestion in the Canadian context, see Sara Allin, Tiffany
Fitzpatrick, Gregory P. Marchildon & Amélie Quesnel-Vallée, The Federal Government
and Canada’s COVID–19 Responses: From “We’re Ready, We’re Prepared” to “Fires
are Burning,” HEALTH ECON., POL. & LAW 1, 10-12 (2021).
122. See, e.g., Monita Karmakar, Paula M. Lantz, & Renuka Tipirneni, Association of
Social and Demographic Factors with COVID–19 Incidence and Death Rates in the US,
JAMA NETWORK OPEN, Jan. 2021, at 10; Johnson & Underhill, supra note 48, at 76-77.
123. See, e.g., DEBORAH BIRX, SILENT INVASION: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE TRUMP
ADMINISTRATION, COVID–19, AND PREVENTING THE NEXT PANDEMIC BEFORE IT’S TOO
LATE 452 (2022) (discussing the importance of sound data in trying to manage a viral
outbreak); Sarah H. Gordon, Nicole Huberfeld, & David K. Jones, What Federalism Means
for the US Response to Coronavirus Disease 2019, JAMA HEALTH FORUM (May 2020)
(emphasizing the important role for the federal government in ensuring standardized data).
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spread. Slowness in testing at the outset of the pandemic stemmed from
tentativeness at the federal level and a failed attempt at centralized testing
kits.124 But throughout the pandemic, public health officials have lacked
the kind of data needed to inform effective decision-making and risk
communication.125 Access to testing has also not been evenly distributed,
and data collection and reporting have been inconsistent across the
nation.126 The absence of consistent data on individuals’ race and ethnicity
has been described as “[t]he most glaring hole” in COVID–19 reporting.127
Congress might even consider authorizing public health authorities to
encourage random testing nationwide—a kind of public health “census”—
that could give a more reliable portrait of disease transmission and
opportunities for assessing the efficacy of public health interventions.
Overall, the backbone of any improved overall public health
infrastructure to address pandemics must begin with an improved data
infrastructure.128 Without better data, combined with clearer statutory
authority and stronger national leadership, the United States is destined to
continue to muddle through whatever remains of the COVID–19
pandemic, not to mention other pandemics in the years ahead.129

124. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
125. Eric C. Schneider, Failing the Test—The Tragic Data Gap Undermining the U.S.
Pandemic Response, NEW ENG. J. MED. (July 2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.
1056/nejmp2014836 [https://perma.cc/QL6U-XU3R]; Jennifer B. Nuzzo & Emily N.
Pond, Covid Vaccines Aren’t Enough. We Need More Tests, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/12/opinion/need-covid-tests.html [https://perma.cc/B
QP2-ABPZ]; see also Kathleen McLaughlin, Growing Use of Home COVID–19 Tests
Leaves Health Agencies in the Dark About Unreported Cases, PBS (Dec. 9, 2021),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/growing-use-of-home-Covid-19-tests-leaves-healthagencies-in-the-dark-about-unreported-cases [https://perma.cc/K48X-H2UA].
126. Beth Blauer & Jennifer Nuzzo, Covid–19 Data Is a Mess. We Need a Way to Make
Sense of It, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/23/opinion/
coronavirus-testing.html [https://perma.cc/YJ2Z-7FRT].
127. Deidre McPhillips, The US Still Isn’t Getting Covid–19 Data Right, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/10/health/covid-data-problems/index.html [https://perma
.cc/98VS-QR3V] (last updated Feb. 21, 2022).
128. Cf. Haffajee & Mello, supra note 118 (noting that an effective response to a
pandemic must be “not only national, but also rational”).
129. In his discussion of the paucity of genetic analysis of COVID–19 test results in the
United States, Michael Lewis quotes molecular biologist Joe Derisi as follows: “Our
federal government should be doing this in a coordinated way. . . . That’s what you do in a
rational society. But the system is broken. It’s so broken.” MICHAEL LEWIS, THE
PREMONITION 268 (2021). For recommendations that include calls for new federal
legislation on disease-related data collection, see NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION, INTERGOVERNMENTAL DIMENSIONS OF THE COVID-19 RESPONSES AND
CONSEQUENCES 51-52 (Mar. 2022).
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IV.
Some degree of muddling may be the best that the United States or
any country can ever do in responding to pandemics. A highly contagious
virus is exceedingly difficult to contain under any circumstances, and even
countries with unitary governments have struggled during the COVID–19
pandemic. But a nation can muddle through more efficaciously or less
efficaciously—and with more or less information and with better or worse
coordination. This much is evident by looking at the experiences of other
countries.
Legal scholar Richard Parker, for example, has compared the United
States’ COVID–19 response to the response of New Zealand.130 He has
recounted how, from the earliest days, New Zealand followed the “public
health playbook,” adopting robust testing and tracing and enforcing social
distancing requirements.131 Instead of being content to muddle through,
New Zealand’s governmental leaders pursued a synoptically rational
approach and generally followed the public health strategies known to
work in the face of an outbreak of a respiratory virus. They put behavioral
measures in place immediately which, when combined with a ban on
international entry to New Zealand, succeeded remarkably well in keeping
the virus at bay and protecting the New Zealand public.
Admittedly, by early 2022 New Zealand did begin to show palpable
signs of social strain from the weight of that nation’s public health
requirements. Protests broke out urging the government to lift its stringent
controls. And as New Zealand did eventually start to lift restrictions in
2022, the spread of the omicron variant increased throughout the country’s
two islands. Still, as of the spring of 2022, New Zealand had only incurred
about seven hundred fatalities in total.132 On a per capita basis, that is a
level of mortality about twenty times smaller than that experienced by the
United States. In other words, had the United States been able to keep its
mortality rates that low, it would have incurred a total of only about 46,000
fatalities, as opposed to the nearly one million deaths experienced by
spring of 2022.
New Zealand’s track record does make the profound extent of
fatalities suffered in the United States look avoidable. One might thus be
tempted to point to New Zealand’s governmental structure—a unitary,
130. Richard Parker, Why America’s Response to the COVID–19 Pandemic Failed:
Lessons from New Zealand’s Success, 73 ADMIN. L. REV. 77 (2021).
131. Id.
132. New Zealand, Johns Hopkins University Coronavirus Resource Center,
https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/region/new-zealand [https://perma.cc/DY85-TFH7] (reporting
697 fatalities from COVID–19) (last accessed Apr. 29, 2022).
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rather than federal, government—and conclude that federalism is what
explains the difference. That conclusion might even seem strengthened by
comparing New Zealand’s experience to that of its island neighbor—
Australia—which, like the United States, also has a federal structure of
government. As of late April 2022, Australia had experienced a per capita
rate of COVID–19 cases that was 30 percent higher than New Zealand’s
and a death rate that was twice as large.133
One must be careful, of course, about drawing too much from such
comparisons, as many factors beyond federalism plausibly explain how
well different nations have fared in the pandemic. Not all federal systems
fared as badly as some unitary governments, and some federal systems
fared better than other federal systems. For example, Germany, a federal
system, experienced lower rates of both COVID–19 cases and fatalities
than did its neighbor, France, with a unitary system of government.134 Still,
Germany’s fatality rate of 163 per 100,000 residents has been nearly half
that of the United States, which has experienced about 300 deaths per
100,000 residents.135 Canada—another federal system—has fared even
better than Germany, with rates of viral spread (10,800 per 100,000) and
fatalities (104 per 100,000).136
Most other developed economies, whether with unitary or federal
systems, have managed to do better than the United States.137 Although it
133. All data on COVID–19 reported in this article are from the Johns Hopkins
University Coronavirus Resource Center, https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/region [https://perma
.cc/C6CX-K9ZQ] (last accessed Apr. 29, 2022). Population data are for 2020 from the
World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL [https://perma.cc/C2VS78SG] (last accessed Apr. 28, 2022). Status of governance structure as federal is drawn
from the Forum of Federations, http://forumfed.org/federal-countries/ [https://perma.cc/S9
Q8-DD2E] (last accessed Apr. 29, 2022).
134. As of April 29, 2022, France had experienced 42,582 cases and 218 fatalities per
100,000 residents. By comparison, Germany had experienced 29,688 cases and 163
fatalities per 100,000 residents.
135. Brazil is among the few countries to have fared even worse than the United States—
with a death rate of about 312 per 100,000. Experts point as much to atrocious leadership
failures of President Jair Bolsonaro as to Brazil’s federal structure of government.
136. See supra note 133 for the sources of data reported in this paragraph.
137. In a comparison of COVID–19 fatality rates in the 15 federal and 15 unitary
countries with the highest per capita GDPs, only Brazil had a worse record than the United
States. Two federal systems—Argentina (283 per 100,000) and Belgium (273)—came next
closest, while two unitary systems—Italy (270) and the United Kingdom (261)—followed.
See generally Benjamin Mueller & Eleanor Lutz, U.S. Has Far Higher COVID Death Rate
Than Other Wealthy Countries, N.Y. TIMES (Feb 1, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2022/02/01/science/COVID-deaths-united-states.html [https://perma.cc/J26C9LXF]; John Agnew, Failing Federalism? U.S. Dualist Federalism and the 2020-22
Pandemic, 9 REG. STUD., REG. SCI. 149 (2022); Mark J. Rozell & Clyde Wilcox,
Federalism in a Time of Plague: How Federal Systems Cope with Pandemic, 50 AM. REV.
PUB. ADMIN. 519-525 (2020).
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cannot be said that the federal nature of the U.S. public health
infrastructure is the sole factor behind the United States’ abysmal
performance in addressing the COVID–19 pandemic, it has undoubtedly
not helped either. With 50 state governments and a deep partisan divide
among them, the United States federal system has arguably proven a
greater hindrance than it has in other countries, such as Canada (with 10
provinces) and Germany (with 16 Länder).138 The legal solicitude that U.S.
courts have given to states’ prerogative over public health has surely not
helped either.
The United States can do better next time—but doing so will require
that government officials learn from the many mistakes made in the wake
of COVID–19. After all, the fundamental problem is not going to
disappear. As long as people continue to move across state borders, a virus
will move with them. One of the lessons that must be learned is how to
reconfigure public health governance to give the national government
greater clarity about its responsibility and authority to act in a time of a
pandemic. National public health agencies need to be able to collect
reliable data and ensure that basic behavioral guidelines can be more
consistently followed and sustained across all states. The nation’s
policymakers should take steps now to create legal structures that will be
needed to ensure more effective risk communication, more widespread
testing and data collection, and greater vaccine uptake whenever the next
pandemic strikes.
V.
In revealing the need to find ways to enable the nation’s public health
infrastructure to adapt quickly when the next pandemic occurs, the
COVID–19 crisis also helps illuminate how the law of federalism ought
not to be conceived as static. In some instances, the need for greater
coordination and clarity about federal authority in response to major, even
existential, problems requires reconfiguring governance and allocating
more authority to the national government.139 Other problems are like a
138. Canada, CIA: THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/
countries/canada/#government [https://perma.cc/JEJ7-Q6CD] (last updated Apr. 28,
2022); Germany, CIA: THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/the-worldfactbook/countries/germany/#government [https://perma.cc/FP4K-SYFZ] (last updated
May 3, 2022).
139. The basic idea here is called subsidiarity—or identifying the correct level of
government that matches the particularities of the governance challenge. KALYPSO
NICOLAÏDIS AND ROBERT HOWSE, EDS., THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF
GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (2001). For a related
approach to institutional design at the international level, see Cary Coglianese,
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pandemic in that they demand more national coordination—and less
muddling through.
Not all cross-border problems, of course, fall into this category. Many
problems, whether related to the environment or to physical infrastructure,
cut across state lines, but in ways that often are limited to a relatively few
states. When water quality declines in the Great Lakes, for example, this
affects all the states that border on the Great Lakes and the tributaries
connected to it—but not the entire nation. As challenging as some crossborder problems may be in their own right, they still leave room for the
tolerance of variability in response and can be handled reasonably well
with normal federalism. In these cases, ad hoc interstate compacts might
suffice to handle coordination, or states may well even go their own way,
serving as laboratories of democracy but without risking a nationwide
catastrophe.
A pandemic is different. It is a mega–interstate problem. Just as a gas
expands to fill whatever space it finds itself in, a respiratory virus will
spread to fill the entire nation. That is why what happens in North Carolina
depends on what happens in other states.
Other interstate problems have similarly extreme interdependencies as a
pandemic, such that they are impossible to solve without effective national
intervention. We can hardly expect these problems to be solved absent
standardized or coordinated federal action.140
Consider, for example, airport security. Terrorists can exploit a
weakness in airport screening at an airport in one city and then find their
way to any other city, or hijack a plane to crash it into buildings in another
city.141 It makes sense, of course, that airport security has been assigned
clear responsibility and authority at the national level.142
Or take electricity transmission as another example. With the main
exception of Texas, the rest of the nation’s electricity distribution network
is interconnected, creating a need to balance load across vast swathes of
the country.143 A power outage or imbalance at one node of the network
Globalization and the Design of International Institutions, in GOVERNANCE IN A
GLOBALIZING WORLD (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & John D. Donohue eds., Brookings 2000).
140. See Beverly A. Cigler, Fighting COVID–19 in the United States with Federalism
and Other Constitutional and Statutory Authority, 51 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 673-692
(2021).
141. For discussion of the interdependencies underlying both airport security problems
and pandemics, see Geoffrey Heal & Howard Kunreuther, Modeling Interdependent Risks,
27 RISK ANALYSIS 621 (2007).
142. Aviation & Transportation Security Act, 49 U.S.C. § 114.
143. Alexandra Klass, Joshua Macey, Shelley Welton & Hannah Wiseman, Grid
Reliability Through Clean Energy, 74 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming). See also Learn More
About Interconnections, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY (last visited Apr. 11, 2022), https://www.
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holds the potential to pass quickly along the entire system.144 Without
careful regional and federal coordination, the grid cannot reliably function.
It thus makes sense that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has
been given clear responsibility and authority at the national level to handle
this complex coordination problem in conjunction with large regional grid
operators.145
And most consequential of all, consider climate change.146 When it
comes to reducing greenhouse gases, the interdependencies are perhaps
just as pronounced as with a viral pandemic.147 One can easily ask: “How
well can North Carolina stave off climate change if South Carolina and
Florida, and the rest of the country, remain slow-footed in reducing
greenhouse gas emissions?” Although scholars and policy leaders have
lauded state and local climate mitigation efforts148—and they are certainly
better than doing nothing—it remains the case that uncoordinated local
and state efforts can only go so far toward solving climate problems in the
absence of national measures.149 For this reason, the absence of federal

energy.gov/oe/services/electricity-policy-coordination-and-implementation/transmissionplanning/recovery-act-0 [https://perma.cc/GK6D-KNUJ].
144. William W. Hogan, Electricity Is a Federal Issue, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2003,
12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB106117150594288000 [https://perma.cc/4V
GW-KJYH].
145. See, e.g., Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92
Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.); Energy Policy Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
16 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); The Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat.
594 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
146. Efforts to adapt to climate change and promote resilient infrastructure will often
have interstate implications too, but usually in regionally limited ways and not with the
extreme transborder interdependencies of climate change itself. The methods needed to
adapt infrastructure to make it resilient to climate will vary considerably from place to
place, depending on whether the climate-related risks take the form of floods, fires, or other
hazards.
147. Cary Coglianese & Jocelyn D’Ambrosio, Policymaking Under Pressure: The
Perils of Incremental Responses to Climate Change, 40 CT. L. REV. 1411 (2008).
148. See, e.g., Cinnamon Carlarne, Notes from a Climate Change Pressure-Cooker:
Sub-Federal Attempts at Transformation Meet National Resistance in the USA, 40 CONN.
L. REV. 1351 (2008); BARRY G. RABE, STATEHOUSE AND GREENHOUSE THE EMERGING
POLITICS OF AMERICAN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY (2004). For an illuminating consideration
of options that might accommodate state innovation while also providing national
coordination in the regulation of energy-consuming appliances used in buildings, see
Alexandra B. Klass, State Standards for Nationwide Products Revisited: Federalism,
Green Building Codes, and Appliance Efficiency Standards, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 335
(2010).
149. Cary Coglianese & Shana Starobin, Let’s Be Real About State and Local Climate
Action, REG. REV. (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.theregreview.org/2018/02/20/coglianesestarobin-state-local-climate-action/ [https://perma.cc/3W8U-RUS5].
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legislation directly addressing climate change is a notable one that leaves
the nation to continue to muddle through.150
VI.
Political scientist Paul Schulman was right to raise questions about the
universal applicability of Charles Lindblom’s decided preference for
incremental approaches to governance.151 Some public problems cannot
be readily solved by the ordinary process of muddling through nor through
the normal system of federalism. Climate change is one of these problems,
and pandemics are another. These mega-interstate problems necessitate a
nationally coordinated response if they are to be managed well. And with
pandemics, the need for this coordinated response must occur quickly—
within days or at most weeks before a virus or its variants can spread. Yet
the very federalist structure of government in the United States, combined
with courts’ use of federalism to reject public health agencies’ use of
general statutory authority, places tragic obstacles in the path of needed
national responses to public health emergencies.
To recognize the need for federal authority to address some problems
is not to suggest that the U.S. must repudiate its tradition of federalism.
On the contrary, recognizing that Congress must do more to empower and
fund federal public health agencies is actually to embrace one of the oldest
constitutional traditions in the United States, namely, that state
prerogatives must sometimes give way for the greater good of the nation.
In some instances, and to address some problems, the federal government
needs clear authority to be able to “promote the general welfare.”152
When it comes to public health infrastructure, there will always remain
a rationale in normal times for maintaining governmental capacity at the
lower levels of government—for that is where people live, get sick, and need
help. But maintaining a state- and local-based public health infrastructure for
normal times does not preclude creating a pandemic federalism structure by
adopting legislation that gives federal officials clear authority—and
responsibility—for taking swift, if temporary, action to contain a deadly
pathogen’s ravaging consequences.
150. For illuminating comparisons between climate change and COVID–19, see Howard C.
Kunreuther & Paul Slovic, Learning from the COVID–19 Pandemic to Address Climate
Change, MGT. & BUS. REV. (2021), https://mbrjournal.com/2021/01/26/learning-from-theCovid–19-pandemic-to-address-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/AM88-QL7R]; Derrick Z.
Jackson, Nearly One Million U.S. Deaths from COVID–19—The Grim Consequences of
Sidelining Science, ENVTL. HEALTH NEWS (Apr. 1, 2022), https://www.ehn.org/covid-climatechange-science-2657051201/beyond-partisan-politics [https://perma. cc/244P-YCLG].
151. See Schulman, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
152. U.S. CONST. pmbl.

